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The Pitfalls of Act of State Analysis in the
Antitrust Context: A Critique of Hunt v. Mobil
Oil
DAVID K. PANSIUS*
Recognizing that the relevant competitive market can be
as encompassing as the world market, American courts have
consistently applied U.S. antitrust laws to acts overseas in an
effort to ensure the competitiveness of the domestic and foreign
commerce of the United States.' Unfortunately, foreign govern-
ments often harbor contrary policy considerations, consciously
or unconsciously encouraging the concentration of given indus-
tries.2 These anticompetitive acts by foreign governments cre-
ate dilemmas for domestic courts in which extraterritorial en-
forcement of the antitrust laws is sought.3 According to the act
* B.A., 1971, M.A., 1973, University of North Carolina; J.D. candidate, Univer-
sity of Denver College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COM-
MERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 2.1 (2d ed. 1973). An excellent judicial review of the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws is found at Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) as amended on denial of rehearing
and rehearing en banc, March 3, 1977.
2. The conduct of the OPEC nations, as a gross example, requires no citation.
Moreover, the temptation to monopolize apparently strikes everyone; for example, the
U.S. is considering an agreement with Canada to set world wheat prices. Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 28, 1977, at 2, col. 2. See also United States v. The Watchmakers of
Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order
modified, 1965 Trade Cas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
However, the general trend may well be toward greater international enforcement
of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Relating
to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, signed in Bonn 23
June 1976. Text of the agreement is reprinted in BNA 1976 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. No. 772, at D-1, D-2.
3. As the district court opinion to the principal case agonized:
It may well be that recent public disclosure of the dealings of multina-
tional corporations with foreign governments which have an adverse im-
pact upon American interests justifies a reappraisal of the act of state
doctrine to determine whether its scope should be confined. However, in
the absence of new doctrinal trends in Supreme Court opinions, reassess-
ment of the range of the doctrine must rest with that Court and not this
court.
Hunt v. Mobil Oil, 410 F. Supp. 10, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.
1977).
See Kintner, Joelson & Vaghi, Groping for a Truly International Antitrust Law,
14 VIRGINIA J. INT'L L. 75, 79-83 (1973).
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of state doctrine, an American court can not inquire into the
validity of acts committed by foreign sovereigns within their
sovereign authority.' Yet the court can not wish to permit large
multinationals to employ foreign sovereigns as agents through
which they can avoid the antitrust laws.5 At first glance, Hunt
v. Mobil Oil' poses such a dilemma.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobil Oil addressed an alleged antitrust violation imple-
mented through private efforts which motivated Libya's na-
tionalization of plaintiff's assets. The court, not wishing to en-
tangle itself in a potentially embarassing investigation of
Libya's nationalization policies, invoked the act of state doc-
trine: Libya was pursuing sovereign policies; the act of state
doctrine bars inquiry into sovereign acts;7 therefore, the moti-
vation behind those sovereign acts was nonjusticiable. 8
The above reasoning would apply except that, for purposes
of an inquiry into motivation, the sovereign was not really the
relevant actor. The act of state doctrine bars only inquiries into
the validity of sovereign acts; it says nothing concerning pri-
vate motivation of sovereign acts. The act of state doctrine
protects only the sovereign's legal authority; it does not protect
private efforts to misuse that authority.'
4. The universal judicial expression of the act of state doctrine is found in Under-
hill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.
The doctrine, stated in modem terms, bars judicial examination of "the validity of an
act of a foreign state by which that state has exercised its juridiction to give effect to
its public interests." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 41
(1965). See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
5. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion)
[hereinafter cited as Mobil Oil].
6. Id.
7. Id. at 73-74.
8. Id. at 77-78.
9. This Comment will repeatedly speak of authority. The concept is analogous, if
not identical, to jurisdiction. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 6 (1965) defines jurisdiction as "the capacity of a state under international
law to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law."
However, since capacity can be interpreted to mean power, and power alone, this
Comment employs authority to mean that which embodies only legal powers, New Era
Milking Co. v. Thompson, 107 Okla. 114, 230 P. 486, 487 (1924); Landry v. Daley, 280
F. Supp. 938, 959 (N.D. 11. 1968), i.e., the right to act. Board of Comm'rs v. Toland,
121 Kan. 109, 245 P. 1019, 1021 (1926). See People v. Wexler, 116 Ill. App. 2d 400, 254
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Although disguised in the opinion, it was the lack of a
showing of wrongful motivation, not the act of state doctrine,
which dictated the ruling against Hunt. The court found that
Libya's nationalization was politically motivated, and the
court found no evidence of wrongful influence such as bribery
by defendants. Rather than searching deeper, the court found
these facts sufficient to rule that a causal connection between
any wrongful acts of defendants and Libya's political act of
nationalization could not be established. Therefore, the claim
had to fail.' 0
The analysis which follows is in three parts. Placing pri-
mary emphasis on the court's ostensible holding, this Com-
ment will first attempt to demonstrate that the act of state
doctrine poses no bar to inquiries into the motivation of sover-
eign acts. Far more briefly, it will detail the "true" holding of
Mobil Oil. And finally, the essay will offer an alternative ra-
tionale to that of act of state through which this holding can
be implemented.
II. THE MOBIL OIL STORY
The facts in Mobil Oil are relatively straightforward.
Hunt, a nonintegrated, independent oil producer, worked an oil
concession in Libya. It competed with "The Seven Sisters,"
vertically integrated oil companies who produced oil in both
Libya and the Persian Gulf." The Libyan oil companies, at the
behest of the Seven Sisters and in response to growing pressure
for concessions from the Libyan government, decided to form
an agreement among themselves in order to augment their bar-
gaining power against Libya. This agreement provided that if
any party's production was reduced as a result of Libyan gov-
ernmental action, the loss would be shared by all producers on
a proportionate basis. 2
In late 1971 a dispute arose between Libya and British
Petroleum (B.P.). Libya asked Hunt to market B.P.'s oil for
them. Hunt, allegedly relying on the agreement and assurances
from the Seven Sisters, refused. The eventual result of the
N.E. 2d 95, 98 (1969) which distinguishes authority from jurisdiction on the basis that
authority embodies only the legal right to act, not the power to act.
10. Mobil Oil at 76.
11. Id. at 70.
12. Originally the Seven Sisters met secretly among themselves. The independent
producers were included in the proceedings in response to a letter from the Justice
Department. The original agreement was signed on January 15, 1971. Mobil Oil at 71.
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dispute was the nationalization of all of Hunt's assets by
Libya."
Hunt alleged that the agreement to limit the freedom of
exclusively Libyan producers was used by the Seven Sisters to
maintain their competitive advantage in Persian Gulf crude.'4
According to Hunt, the Seven Sisters manipulated the course
of the negotiations with Libya, knowing full well that Hunt's
required response would result in his nationalization.' 5 Conse-
quently, the agreement not only prevented Hunt from reaching
an independent settlement with Libya but served to eliminate
Hunt from the Libyan oil market altogether.
Although Hunt's broad allegations would be difficult to
establish, 7 they nonetheless asserted a conspiracy by the Seven
Sisters which, if proven, would constitute a violation of the
Sherman Act." The majority, however, ignored the Sherman
Act claim and, finding no distinction between inquiring into
the motivation behind a sovereign act and judging the validity
of that act, invoked the act of state doctrine to deny Hunt's
claim:
We conclude that the political act complained of here was clearly
within the act of state doctrine and that since the disputed plead-
13. Mobil Oil at 71-72.
14. The competitive advantage that the majors were allegedly seeking to preserve
was their virtual monopoly of Persian Gulf production. Libyan production enjoyed cost
advantages. Consequently the increasing share of Libyan production enjoyed by the
independents threatened the world dominance of the Seven Sisters. Therefore, alleg-
edly, the majors formed a conspiracy to eliminate the independents from the Libyan
market. 410 F. Supp. at 15.
15. Mobil Oil at 72 n.2.
16. Mobil Oil at 71-72.
17. Judge Van Graafeiland, who dissented, expressed doubts as to whether plain-
tiff would be able to prove facts sufficient to support his cause of action. Mobil Oil at
79. See text accompanying notes 94-99 infra.
18. Sherman § 1 states in part:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
Sherman § 2 follows:
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor .... 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). See, e.g. United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (a conspiracy to eliminate competition violates the Sherman
Act even if the actions would have been lawful if done by the conspirators individu-
ally). American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93, 107 (6th Cir. 1944), aff'd,
328 U.S. 781 (1946).
VOL. 6:749
HUNT V. MOBIL OIL
ings inevitably call for a judgment on the sovereign acts of Libya
the claim is non-justiciable."
III. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The court cited persuasive authority for the proposition
that the act of state doctrine remains a vital tool of American
jurisprudence. 0 The majority failed to show, however, how
such authority requires that a bar to an inquiry into the valid-
ity of a sovereign act bars an investigation of the private moti-
vation behind that act.21 A brief consideration of the origins
and applications of the act of state doctrine dictates a contrary
analysis.
Much of the foundation for the act of state doctrine can
be derived from the writings of Mr. Justice Story and his con-
temporaries. According to Story's analysis the court defers to
an act of a foreign sovereign not because he possesses the status
of sovereign, but because he exercises sovereign authority.22
19. Mobil Oil at 73.
20 Besides Underhill v. Hernandez (see note 4 supra), the court relies on Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (see text accompany-
ing notes 37-41 infra) and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
(see note 25 infra).
21. The court employs Dunhill and Sabbatino for the proposition that
"[e]xpropriations of the property of an alien within the boundaries of the sovereign
state are traditionally considered to be public acts of the sovereign removed from
judicial scrutiny by application of the act of state rubric." Mobil Oil at 73. Such a
characterization broadens the act of state doctrine.
In fact, even in Sabbatino, which upheld a Cuban act of expropriation, the Court
consistently limited the doctrine to the validity of the sovereign act. The act of state
doctrine prevents a court from declaring a sovereign act "invalid" or "ineffective."
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964). "[W]e decide only
that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of taking of property within its
own territory by a foreign sovereign government .... " Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
Nothing in Sabbatino, Dunhill, or even Underhill interprets the act of state doctrine
to bar an inquiry into the motives behind that sovereign act.
22. Story expressed the notion of authority in terms of territorial jurisdiction "it
is plain that the laws of one country can have no intrinsic force, proprio vigore, except
within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of that country." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (6th ed. 1865). "This is the natural principle flowing from
the equality and independence of nations. For it is an essential attribute of every
sovereignty, that it has no admitted superior, and that it gives the supreme law within
its own dominions on all subjects appertaining to its sovereignty." Id. § 8.
Therefore, when a court defers to a sovereign act they defer to the sovereign's
authority, his right to make laws. Id. § 19. It is the "sovereignty" not the "sovereign"
which the act of state doctrine protects. See id. § 18. Thus Story consistently dealt
with the sovereign's laws, not the sovereign himself. The equal authority of nations did
not bar inquiries into the nature and effect of sovereign laws. See Story's discussion of
comity, id. §§ 29-38a.
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The act of state doctrine does not require judicial recognition
of every act performed by foreign sovereigns;23 the doctrine rec-
ognizes only authoritative acts. 4 Its purpose is to preserve the
integrity of sovereign authority by barring review of the valid-
ity of authoritative acts; that is, one sovereign cannot invali-
date the authoritative acts of another sovereign. To do so would
contravene the equal authority of sovereigns. 5
23. For example, where a sovereign confiscates assets of its citizens held in the
United States, the act will be denied effect as contrary to the policy of the United
States.
Tabacalera Severiano Jorge v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968); Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47
(2d Cir. 1965); Rupali Bank v. Provident National Bank, 403 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Vladikavsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 189 N.E. 456 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1934).
24. An act loses its sovereign character when it is performed outside the limits of
one's sovereign authority. See discussion of Rose v. Himely in text accompanying notes
28-36, infra.
In The Appollon, the Court denied effect to a U.S. seizure of a French vessel on
the St. Mary's River, then the border between the United States and Spanish Florida.
[Hiowever general and comprehensive the phrases used in our munici-
pal laws may be, they must always be restricted in construction to places
and persons, upon whom the Legislature have authority and jurisdiction.
In the present case, Spain had an equal authority with the United States
over the river St. Mary's. The attempt to compel an entry of vessels,
destined through those waters to Spanish territories, would be an usurpa-
tion of exclusive jurisdiction over all the navigation of the river.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824).
25. In the Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Justice
Marshall discussed how the sovereign rights of nations inevitably force a nation to cede
a certain degree of its territorial powers.
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal
rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by
intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of those good offices
which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have con-
sented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar circum-
stances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective
territories which sovereignty confers.
A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, .... which
should suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial pow-
ers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations of
the civilized world.
Id. at 136-37.
The act of state doctrine encompasses this principle. A nation will not exercise
its territorial jurisdiction to invalidate another nation's exercise of sovereign authority.
See also J.STORY, supra note 22, §§ 29-38a.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) apparently rejects
authority as the basis for the act of state doctrine: "While historic notions of sovereign
authority do bear upon the wisdom of employing the act of state doctrine, they do not
VOL. 6:749
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Consequently, since the act of state doctrine protects only
a sovereign's authority, the purpose or motivation of a sover-
eign act, as distinct from the legality of a sovereign act, re-
mains subject to judicial examination. An American court can-
not declare illegal another sovereign's law; it cannot judge its
validity. But, nonetheless, an American court can examine the
motivation of that act in the proper exercise of its extraterrito-
rial authority over American citizens violating American
laws.26
The mere presence of a sovereign actor does not in itself
halt judicial inquiry. In fact American courts have traditionally
examined the circumstances surrounding and motivating a
sovereign's act in order to determine if the act of state doctrine
is in fact applicable.27 In Rose v. Himely,25 for example, Chief
Justice Marshall expressed no reluctance in examining the pur-
pose behind and circumstances surrounding France's enforce-
ment of a maritime regulation. In Rose, a French public vessel
seized a ship doing business with rebel forces on Santo Dom-
ingo in violation of French law. The French captured the ship
outside French territorial waters and sold its cargo in Cuba, the
French court in Santo Domingo endorsing the seizure. The
original owner libelled the cargo when it reached South Caro-
lina.29
dictate its existence." Id. at 421.
However, one must view Harlan's statement in the context of his decision to
restrict, not broaden, the application of the act of state doctrine. Harlan upheld Cuba's
nationalization in a Marshallesque manner, by creating an exception to the act of state
doctrine where international law is sufficiently defined to provide standards of judicial
inquiry. Id. at 428. These international standards in effect limit the authority of sover-
eigns-and thereby render the sovereign acts outside mandated standards subject to
judicial review. See Simson, The Return of American Banana: A Contemporary
Perspective on American Antitrust Abroad, 9 J. I"T'L L. & EcoN., 233, 252 (1974)
(characterizing Sabbatino as advocating a more independent role for the judiciary in
act of state cases); Wright, Reflections on the Sabbatino Case, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 304,
310 (1965) (arguing Sabbatino would overrule acts of state where those acts are beyond
sovereign jurisdiction as defined by international law).
26. See note 83 infra.
27. The dissenting opinion in Mobil Oil cites Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) and Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank,
114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940) as authority for this proposition. Dunhill is discussed in
text accompanying notes 37-41 infra. In Banco de Espana the court was forced to
examine the nature of the sovereign conduct in order to determine if it indeed had been
done by a foreign sovereign.
28. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808).
29. Id. at 268.
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The Court faced the issue of whether or not the French
seizure effectively passed title.30 In ruling that it did not Chief
Justice Marshall examined the purpose and circumstances sur-
rounding the sovereign act of seizure. Justice Marshall rea-
soned that had the seizure been an act of war, then France
would have had the authority to act outside its territorial wa-
ters. Since the seizure was to enforce only commercial regula-
tions, however, international custom limited France's author-
ity to France's own territory.' The seizure was not "within
those limits which circumscribe the sovereign power";32 there-
fore, the Court refused to give the seizure effect. 3
Chief Justice Marshall never questioned the validity of
France's regulations, nor France's potential right to seize the
vessel.34 However, Marshall did examine the nature of the act
(the fact that it took place outside of territorial waters) 3 as well
as the purpose of the seizure which was for commercial regula-
tion, not in pursuance of acts of war.31
Spanning over 160 years, the continued willingness of the
Court to probe the circumstances surrounding sovereign acts is
illustrated by the recent decision in Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba.37 In Dunhill, certain cigar importers
mistakenly paid for cigar shipments by sending the money to
the Cuban government instead of the now-expropriated owners
of the cigar factories. When Dunhill tried to get its money back,
its demands were ignored. The Court faced the question of
30. The power of the French court in Santo Domingo then is, of
necessity, examinable to a certain extent by that tribunal which is com-
pelled to decide whether its sentence has changed the right of property.
The power, under which it acts, must be looked into; and its authority
to decide questions, which it professes to decide, must be considered.
Id. at 269.
31. The rights of war may be exercised on the high seas, because war
is carried on upon the high seas; but the pacific rights of sovereignty must
be exercised within the territory of the sovereign.
Id. at 279.
32. Id.
33. Justifying their examination of France's authority, Chief Justice Marshall
stated, "[Tihe law of nations is the law of all tribunals in the society of nations
.... "Id. at 277.
34. Id. at 274.
35. Id. at 279.
36. Id.
37. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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whether or not the Cuban refusal was a nonjusticiable act of
state. :"
In Dunhill the Court did not merely examine the motiva-
tion of the act but went further, passing judgment on the na-
ture of the Cuban political system itself. The majority decided
in favor of Dunhill by ruling that the refusal was without sover-
eign authority." The Court held that the Cuban bureaucrats
now running the cigar industries lacked the requisite sovereign
authority for their refusal to constitute a sovereign act. Cuba
did not prove that these officials had been invested with sover-
eign authority to repudiate all or any part of the debts incurred
by those businesses.40 Therefore the Court refused to grant act
of state immunity to the repudiation.4'
The inquiry requested by plaintiff in Mobil Oil was hardly
as dramatic as the issues faced by the Court in Rose and
Dunhill. Unlike these latter cases, plaintiffs did not ask the
Mobil Oil court to repudiate, or even deny effect to Libya's act
of nationalization. Rather, Hunt requested only an inquiry into
the motivation behind the act in order to pursue a private
remedy. This motivational inquiry would not impinge on
Libya's sovereign authority; in fact, the majority itself fre-
quently referred to the political, anti-American purposes of the
nationalization.4" Since the legality of the nationalization was
not at issue, the act of state doctrine should have posed no bar.
More generally, in the antitrust context act of state im-
munity is limited to those instances where the private defen-
dant acts as the sovereign.43 The American courts lack the au-
thority to deny effect to a foreign sovereign's exercise of sover-
eign authority. Therefore, in Mobil Oil, for example, the court
could not order the restoration of Hunt's production facilities
38. Id. at 689-90.
39. Id. at 695. In the portion of the opinion which follows Mr. Justice White
argues: "In their commercial capacities, foreign governments do not exercise powers
peculiar to sovereigns." Id. at 704. Therefore the act of state doctrine does not apply
"to acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their purely commercial
operations." Id. at 706. Mr. Justice Stevens, however, did not subscribe to this portion
of the opinion, id. at 715, leaving only four of the nine justices advocating this "purely
commercial" exception to the act of state doctrine.
40. Id. at 691-93.
41. Id. at 694.
42. See text accompanying notes 92, 93 infra.
43. See text accompanying note 88 infra.
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nationalized by the sovereign in Libya. However, given the
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act," the court did have
authority to prosecute American violators of that Act; the court
did have authority to impose liability on the Seven Sisters for
their alleged efforts to get Hunt nationalized. 5
IV. THE PRECEDENTIAL WEIGHT OF AMERICAN BANANA
The Mobil Oil majority relied heavily on American Ba-
nana v. United Fruit Co." as precedent for the view that the
act of state doctrine bars motivational inquiries. In American
Banana plaintiff sued for treble damages under the Sherman
Act, claiming that United Fruit prompted the government of
Costa Rica to seize plaintiff's banana plantation and railway. 7
Justice Holmes denied the claim stating that "seizure by a
state is not a thing that can be complained of elsewhere in the
courts."" The fact that Costa Rica acted "by virtue of its sover-
eign power" within its de facto jurisdiction necessarily made
that act legal;" therefore, the prior persuasion became legal as
well.5 0
However, the ruling cited above was not specifically re-
lated to the adjudication of the Sherman Act and, therefore,
carries little precedential weight. Holmes had earlier deter-
mined that the Sherman Act did not apply to acts outside the
territory of the United States.5 Although certainly the act of
the sovereign himself will be deemed lawful within his terri-
tory, 5 Holmes' statement that the private act of persuasion
was also per se lawful referred to whether plaintiff could main-
tain an action in tort against United Fruit. 3 Although antitrust
44. See note 1 supra.
45. The extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act is illustrated by courts now
imposing liability on American defendants where the only significant injury is to a
foreign plaintiff overseas. See Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon
Research & Engineering Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1977-1 Trade Cas.) 61,256
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1977); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co., Ltd. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
46. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
47. Id. at 354.
48. Id. at 357-58.
49. Id. at 357.
50. Id. at 358.
51. Id. at 355-57.
52. Id. at 356.
53. The fundamental reason why persuading a sovereign power to do
this or that cannot be a tort . . . is that it is a contradiction in terms to
VOL. 6:749
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violations can be classified as torts, the statutory cause of ac-
tion can hardly be limited to tort concepts." While tort has
peculiarly domestic connotations, the antitrust laws do not."5
Once one admits the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman
Act, which Justice Holmes did not,56 the identity between the
lawfulness of the private act of persuasion and its public con-
summation breaks down.5" Although overseas, a citizen re-
mains subject to the laws of his nation." Just because the act
say that within its jurisdiction it is unlawful to persuade a sovereign
power to bring about a result that it declares by its conduct to be desira-
ble and proper . . . It makes the persuasion lawful by its own act.
Id. at 358. Note how this statement conforms to the rule stated in Parker v. Brown
discussed in text accompanying notes 100-102 infra.
54. The Sherman Act, and the subsequent antitrust legislation, represent a broad
effort designed to preserve for the public the benefits of free competition. The purpose
of the Sherman Act was to condemn activity which "by reason of intent or the inherent
nature of the contemplated acts, prejudice the public interests by unduly restricting
competition or unduly obstructing the course of trade." Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United
States, 297 U.S. 553, 597 (1936); United States v. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388-
89 (1923); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376 (1913).
As Representative Stewart stated in his concluding speech before the House: "The
provisions of this trust bill are just as broad, sweeping, and explicit as the English
language can make them to express the power of Congress over this subject under the
Constitution of the United States .... " 21 CONG. REc. 6314 (1890), quoted in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 n.46 (1944).
See also W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at § 1.1.
55. The Sherman Act specifically applies to commerce "with foreign nations." See
note 18 supra; Pacific Seafarers' Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969) (applying the Sherman Act to U.S.
shipping between two foreign ports).
56. The majority in Mobil Oil admits that Justice Holmes' "disaffection for [the
Sherman Act] needs little documentation;" (at 74 n.6) but distinguishes this bias
based on the unanimity of the American Banana decision. See Note, Extraterritorial
Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REv.
1005, 1009 & n.23 (1976).
57. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291
(D. Del. 1970) granted act of state immunity to an antitrust defendant because the
court found that the sovereign compelled the defendant to perform the anticompetitive
acts. Nonetheless the court took time to distinguish the applicability of American
Banana, which also would have granted immunity. The court determined that
American Banana's bar to an inquiry into the motivation behind a soveriegn's act
applies "only in those cases where the conspiracy has no effect within the United
States." Id. at 1297 n.13. Once such effects are shown the motivation behind the
sovereign acts becomes a proper subject of inquiry.
58. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 415 (1932) (Court has power to subpoena
United States citizens residing overseas); Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) (Congress
has power to tax income earned overseas); Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944)
(U.S. correspondence school barred from using fraudulent advertising in Latin Amer-
ica). See W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at § 2.22.
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he performs is legal according to the laws of his host country,
does not necessarily mean the act will be legal according to the
laws of the country of his citizenship.59 The authoritative reach
of the Sherman Act is not limited by geographic boundaries.
As Judge van Graafeiland noted in his Mobil Oil dissent, sub-
sequent cases have ignored the broad American Banana bar
once the extraterritorial applicability of the Sherman Act has
been recognized. 0
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has yet to expressly
overrule American Banana's refusal to inquire into the motiva-
tion behind a sovereign's acts. For example, in Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co.' the Canadian government
appointed a wholly owned subsidiary of Union Carbide, Electro
Met, as its exclusive wartime agent "to purchase and allocate
vanadium for Canadian industries . . ."" In a suit alleging
monopolization of the vanadium industry,6 3 Continental
charged that Union Carbide used its exclusive agency to bar
Continental's access into the vanadium market in Canada.64
Both the district and circuit courts denied Continental's claim,
[Alithough the laws of a nation have no direct binding force, or effect,
except upon persons within its own territories; yet that every nation has
a right to bind its own subjects by its own laws in every other place.
J. STORY, supra note 22, at § 21.
59. A conspiracy formed and executed from Japan remains subject to U.S. anti-
trust laws, regardless of the lawfulness of the acts in Japan. United States v. R.P.
Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
Actions in Switzerland that restrained U.S. foreign commerce are actionable even
if they had the tacit approval of the Swiss government. United States v. The Watch-
makers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600 at 77,456-
57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
The antitrust laws apply where actions affect U.S. commerce "irrespective of the
citizenship of the actor and the place where the activity took place." Sabre Shipping
Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
See also United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 120 (1911) (An
agreement in restraint of trade, "although actually made in a foreign country where
not unlawful, gives no immunity to parties acting here in pursuance of it.").
60. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (the
modern rule does not bar an antitrust claim merely because alleged injuries resulted
from acts of a foreign sovereign). See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 80-
89 infra; Mobil Oil at 80-81 (dissenting opinion).
61. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
62. The Court describing plaintiff's allegations in his complaint, id. at 695.
63. Vanadium is a metal used in the steel making process.
64. 370 U.S. at 695, 702-03.
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arguing that Continental's exclusion was a "transaction wholly
in the hands of the Canadian Government. . .. "I'
In overturning the rulings of the lower courts, the Court
seemingly drew the distinction between judging the validity of
a sovereign act and judging the motivation behind that act:
In the present case petitioners do not question the validity of any
action taken by the Canadian Government or by its Metals Con-
troller. Nor is there left in the case any question of the liability
of the Canadian Government's agent, for Electro Met of Canada
was not served. What the petitioners here contend is that the
respondents are liable for actions which they themselves jointly
took, as part of their unlawful conspiracy, to influence or to direct
the elimination of Continental from the Canadian market. (em-
phasis added)"
The act of state doctrine arguably limited the number of avail-
able defendants; Continental could not sue Canada's ap-
pointed agent acting in its agency capacity. 7 However, the
remaining parties continued to be liable for their private acts
of conspiracy." They were "not insulated by the fact that their
conspiracy involved some acts by the agent of a foreign govern-
ment.""
Nonetheless, despite the references to "influence" in the
opinion, Continental Ore does not explicitly endorse an anti-
trust suit based solely on wrongful motivation of a foreign sov-
ereign's anticompetitive acts. In the quote above referring to
efforts to influence Continental's elimination, one is not sure
if the Court is speaking of influencing the market, or influenc-
ing the Canadian government, or both.70 Consequently, the via-
bility of a purely motivational antitrust claim remains an unre-
solved question.
Proponents of a broad act of state defense point to United
65. Id. at 703, quoting the district court.
66. Id. at 706.
67. See discussion of Cantor v. Detroit Edison in text accompanying notes 100-
112 infra.
68. See discussion of Noerr doctrine in text accompanying notes 113-134 infra.
69. 370 U.S. at 706.
70. Arguably, the Court was referring to attempts to influence the Canadian gov-
ernment or its agents. The sentence immediately following the reference to "influence"
cites Sisal: "[Riespondents are not insulated by the fact that their conspiracy in-
volved some acts by the agent of a foreign government." Id. at 706.
However, no court has cited this specific language to impose liability solely for
attempts to influence foreign governments; therefore, the doubt remains.
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States v. Sisal Sales7' to support the continued viability of
American Banana's prohibition of inquiries into the motivation
of sovereign acts." In Sisal the United States charged defen-
dants with a conspiracy to monopolize sisal, a fibre used in
making twine. The alleged conspirators had persuaded foreign
governments to pass discriminatory legislation, legislation
which was employed by the defendants to destroy all competi-
tion in the sisal industry.73 The Court ruled that this discrimi-
natory legislation afforded defendants no protection. "True,
the conspirators were aided by discriminating legislation, but
by their own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, they brought
about forbidden results within the United States."7
In Sisal, the Court found numerous antitrust violations
beyond the mere influence of foreign legislators. 5 Therefore,
the Court readily sidestepped the specific motivational issue of
American Banana: "The United States complain of a violation
of their laws within their own territory by parties subject to
their jurisdiction, not merely of something done by another
government at the instigation of private parties."76 However,
the fact that Sisal distinguishes, rather than overrules,
American Banana can hardly be considered an endorsement of
motivational act of state immunity."
71. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
72. The essential argument being the Sisal, rather than overruling American
Banana, took pains to distinguish it.
[Tihe holding of American Banana that has endured is that the act of
state doctrine bars a claim for antitrust injury flowing from foreign sover-
eign acts allegedly induced and procured by the defendant.
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 110 (C.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972);
accord, Mobil Oil at 75-76. See also W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at § 2.21. But see text
accompanying notes 51-60 supra.
73. 274 U.S. at 274.
74. Id. at 276.
75. Among other things the Court found exclusive dealing arrangements and
"constant manipulation of the markets." Id. at 274-75.
76. Id. at 276. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952).
77. Joel Davidow, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, in analyzing Sisal and Continental Ore, came to the conclu.
sion, albeit tenuous. "that the act of state doctrine does not apply if the foreign
government officials were mere pawns in a private conspiracy, rather than a major
moving force behind the scheme." Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy, and Interna.
tional Buying Cooperation, 84 Ymuz L.J. 268, 283 (1974). The test Davidow articulates
is quite similar to the analysie derived from Cantor v. Detroit Edison concerning state
action immunity. See text accompanying notes 103-108 infra.
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V. AUTHORITY ANALYSIS APPLIED IN THE ANTITRUST CONTEXT
Barring a definitive Supreme Court ruling on the motiva-
tional issue, one must return to the nature of the act of state
doctrine itself for guidance. The fundamental purpose of the
act of state doctrine is to protect sovereign authority, not sover-
eigns."8 Applying this authority analysis, the act of state doc-
trine quarantines only those private acts genuinely compelled
by the invocation of sovereign authority. The majority of mod-
ern cases adopt this approach, limiting the act of state defense
to compulsion only.79
For example, in striking down restraints on the imports of
watches into the United States, United States v. The Watch-
makers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc."0 ignored non
authoritative acts of the foreign sovereign. The court found
immaterial "the fact that the Swiss Government may, as a
practical matter, approve of the effects of this private activity
... ,,81 "In the absence of direct foreign governmental action
compelling the defendants' activities," the conspirators re-
mained liable for their infractions of the antitrust laws.82 Other
courts faced with similar anticompetitive policies of foreign
sovereigns have followed the rule of Watchmakers, denying
immunity. 83
78. See text accompanying notes 20-26 supra.
79. The principal exception being Buttes Gas, discussed at note 72 supra.
The dissenting opinion in Mobil Oil finds this case "clearly distinguishable" in
that plaintiff's claim was premised on alleged wrongful acts of the sovereign, as well
as of the private parties. Mobile Oil at 81 n.3.
80. 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas.
71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
81. Id. at 77,456-57.
82. Id. at 77,457.
83. "[Mlere governmental appproval or foreign governmental involvement
which the defendants had arranged does not necessarily provide a defense [to the
antitrust laws]." Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 606
(1976). See Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949,
954 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied, 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940
(1969).
Even Continental Ore implies that sovereign compulsion is the only available act
of state defense: it was immaterial that defendant "was acting in a manner permitted
by Canadian law. There is nothing to indicate that such law in any way compelled
discriminatory purchasing, and it is well settled that acts which are in themselves legal
lose that character when they become constituent elements of an unlawful scheme."
370 U.S. at 707 (emphasis added).
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the need to show compulsion has been the
furor arising from Arab efforts to coerce U.S. companies into boycotting Israel. In
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As Watchmakers indicates, the only real act of state de-
fense is sovereign compulsion; Interamerican Refining Corp. v.
Texaco Maracaibo, Inc."4 further explains this defense. Intera-
merican Refining alleged that defendants were engaged in a
boycott designed to bar its access to Venezualan crude oil."
The court, however, found "that defendants were compelled by
regulatory authorities in Venezuala to boycott plaintiff.""'
Such compulsion constituted "a complete defense to an action
under the antitrust laws based on that boycott." 7
The court explained the compulsion defense in terms of
the act of state doctrine's function of protecting the legal au-
thority of sovereigns:
January 1977 the Justice Department and Bechtel Corporation reached a tentative
settlement of the Justice Department's suit charging Bechtel with conspiring to boy-
cott companies blacklisted by the Arabs. BNA 1977 ANTrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No.
796, at A-17-18.
The Competitive Impact Statement filed with the proposed consent decree vividly
illustrates the compulsion doctrine. The Justice Department would not direct Bechtel
to perform "foreign conduct [which] directly conflicts with foreign law valid in a
foreign sovereignty," but did enjoin actions to implement the boycott "within the
sovereign jurisdiction of the United States." "Such implementation in the United
States could not be excused on the ground that it was directed by a foreign state, since
that would intrude on the terms of trade within the sovereign territory of the United
States where United States law is paramount." Id. at E-5.
As dictated by the act of state doctrine, the Justice Department expressly limited
the sovereign compulsion defense to the narrow scope of the sovereign's authority.
"[Floreign sovereign compulsion may not override enforcement of conflicting United
States law expressing a sovereign and public interest as to conduct within the United
States .... " Id. at E-6.
Consequently, although Bechtel was granted permission to contract and work on
projects for Arab nations implementing the boycott, it was barred from making any
discriminatory selection of subcontractors based on boycott directives (provided that
at least one U.S. subcontractor was solicited). Where discriminatory criteria was to be
applied, the Arab nation itself must "specifically and unilaterally" choose the subcon-
tractors. Id. at E-8 (emphasis in original). Thus the Department limited immunity to
the specific commands of the sovereign.
One must note that the Justice Department apparently considers foreign sovereign
compulsion and the act of state doctrine to be two separate defenses. Id. at E-6.
However, applied in practice, the Department draws no clear distinction between the
two defenses. UNITED STATES DEPARrMENr oF JUsTI cE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS (1977), reprinted in BNA 1977 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No.
799, at E-1; see id. at E-15, E-16. See also UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
MEMORANDUM CONCERNING ANTITRUST AND FOREIGN COMMERCE (1972), reprinted in
[1972-77 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 50,129, at 55,211. See W. FUGATE note
89 infra for an attempt to rationalize the act of state-sovereign compulsion distinction.
84. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
85. Id. at 1292.
86. Id. at 1296.
87. Id.
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[Slovereignty includes the right to regulate commerce within
the nation. When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there
have no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively
acts of the sovereign."
Since the act of state doctrine protects only authoritative acts,
the defense extends only to "genuine compulsion." The Texaco
court explicitly refused to base its opinion on American
Banana; attempts to influence or manipulate a foreign sover-
eign in order to defeat the antitrust laws remain subject to
liability. 9
Since the act of state defense applies only in cases of gen-
iune compulsion, the doctrine serves more as a bar to available
remedies than as a bar to liability. Generalizing, the act of
state doctrine prevents the courts from countermanding the
authoritative acts of another sovereign. This will limit courts
to remedies which do not conflict with established foreign law."
The cause of action is barred altogether only when the corpora-
tion stands directly in the shoes of the sovereign, that is, when
88. Id. at 1298 (emphasis added).
89. See discussion of Texaco holding at note 57 supra.
Noting in the materials before the Court indicates that defendants either
procured the Venezualan order or that they acted voluntarily pursuant
to a delegation of authority to control the oil industry. The narrow ques-
tion for decision is the availability of genuine compulsion as a defense.
307 F. Supp. at 1297 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Fugate argues that the sovereign compulsion defense is distinct from the act of
state defense. The act of state doctrine prevents "inquiry by U.S. courts into the
validity of a foreign's act; the antitrust foreign compulsion principle, on the other
hand, concerns antitrust liability for acts of private parties done pursuant to foreign
law or at the direction of a foreign government." W. FUGATE, supra note 1, § 2.21, at
82.
Fugate has in fact drawn no distinction at all. The sovereign compulsion principle
represents nothing more than the act of state doctrine applied to the antitrust context.
One does not sue the sovereign in an antitrust suit (see note 79 supra); rather, one sues
the private wrongdoer. The private actor becomes immune from suit only because,
through sovereign compulsion, he stands in the shoes of the sovereign. By acting in
the sovereign's place, the private actor obtains the sovereign's act of state immunity.
See note 83 supra for the Justice Department's current approach to this distinc-
tion.
90. The sovereign compulsion doctrine has been incorporated into a number of
consent decrees. Thus an injunction does not apply "to any act in a foreign country
which defendant. . . can show was officially required of defendant. . . by the govern-
ment thereof." United States v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 1957 Trade Cas.
68,836 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1960 Trade Cas.
69,849 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. United Fruit Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 68,941
(E.D. La. 1958); United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 1
69,065 (D.N.J. 1958). See also discussion of Bechtel note 83 supra.
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its actions are compelled by the sovereign." Essentially the
cause of action is barred because there is no available rem-
edy-the only wrongdoer is the sovereign himself.
VI. THE RULE TO BE DERIVED FROM MOBIL OIL
If the act of state doctrine applies only in cases of sovereign
compulsion, on what theory, then, can the Mobil Oil majority
legitimately rest its holding?
Primarily, the court applied act of state rationales, not act
of state rules. The court deferred, not to the sovereign authority
of Libya, but to her sovereign status. Libya seized Hunt's prop-
erty, in part, as retribution against the United States for failure
to properly accomodate Arab interests.2 Thus, although a re-
view of the motivation behind the nationalization would not
have violated the commands of act of state, it might have
proven personally embarrassing to Libyan President Qadhafi
for the court to judge if these ostensibly nationalistic acts had
been engineered by private American oil interests. 3
The court, although it did not articulate it, in effect
weighed this embarrassment against the likelihood that an an-
titrust violation had in fact taken place. 4 The court noted that
91. The compulsion doctrine has apparent application in the domestic setting as
well. See note 109 infra.
92. Any possible doubt about [the issue of political motivation] is
in any event removed since upon the seizure of Hunt's property on June
11, 1973 President alQadhafi announced "[w]e proclaim loudly that this
United States needs to be given a big hard blow in the Arab area on its
cold insolent face . . . . The time has come for the Arab peoples to
confront the United States, the time has come for the U.S. interests to
be threatened earnestly and seriously in the Arab area, regardless of the
cost."
Mobil Oil at 73.
93. The court characterized an inquiry into the Libyan nationalization as a
"Serbonian Bog." Mobil Oil at 77.
94. At first reading the language would suggest a blanket application of the act
of state doctrine: "we cannot logically separate Libya's motivation from the validity
of its seizure." But the language immediately following stressed heavily the delicacy
of the inquiry. Mobil Oil at 77.
The court cites Dunhill and Sabbatino as authority for the proposition that the
function of the act of state doctrine is to avoid embarrassment of sovereigns and our
State Department. The quote from Dunhill applies only to "adjudications involving
the legality of acts of foreign states. ... Mobil Oil at 77 (emphasis added); Alfred
Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. at 697. As discussed earlier, the
Dunhill court felt no inhibitions in dissecting the nature of Cuban sovereign processes.
See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
Because of the language cited in Mobil Oil referring to separation of powers,
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there was no allegation of scandalous behavior, such as bribery,
committed by the Seven Sisters." Although not mentioned by
the court, Hunt's pleadings also appear to be deliberately
vague." Consequently, given the proven element of at least
some political motivation behind the nationalization, the court
must have concluded that Hunt could not demonstrate a suffi-
cient causal connection between the acts of the alleged conspir-
ators and the sovereign act of nationalization to warrant an
antitrust recovery.
[Alppellants admit that antitrust liability cannot be attributed
to the defendants unless Hunt can prove that but for their combi-
nation or conspiracy Libya would not have moved against it.'
Quite reasonably, Hunt's vague allegations, coupled with the
unchallenged political component of the nationalization, failed
to meet this "but for" standard.
However, rather than so ruling, the court sought safer
grounds." The court stretched the act of state doctrine in order
to avoid a serious judicial inquiry into the nationalization. To
inquire into the motivation of an act was to inquire into the
validity of the act; this inquiry was barred by the act of state
doctrine. By employing this "reasoning" the court avoided a
specific ruling on the causal issue."
Sabbatino may generate some confusion. Mobil Oil at 77; Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. Nonetheless, the full opinion clearly indicates that the
separation of powers analysis derives from the political nature of the controversy, not
the potential embarrassment to the participants. The Court indicated that had there
been sufficient international standards regarding the illegality of nationalizations,
Sabbatino's claim would have been justiciable. 376 U.S. at 428.
95. Mobil Oil at 79.
96. Mobil Oil at 72 n.2.
97. Mobil Oil at 76 (emphasis in original).
98. Technically, one is not penalized for vague pleadings; failure to specifically
define one's antitrust allegations should not defeat the complaint. Harman v. Valley
National Bank of Arizona, 339 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1964). However, if one must rely
on distinguishing private from public activity in order to maintain a cause of action,
perhaps a rule requiring specific causal allegations should be applied. Even in complex
antitrust suits, where public policy demands, allegations in complaints must be more
than conclusory. Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint
Executive Board of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 1976) (public
policy interest was the protection of first amendment rights).
99. "Another inquiry could only be fissiparous, hindering or embarassing the con-
duct of foreign relations which is the very reason underlying the policy of judicial
abstention expressed in the [act of state] doctrine .... " Mobil Oil at 77.
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VII. ALTERNATIVE RULES FOR JUDGING THE MOTIVATION OF
FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
The majority in Mobil Oil erred, not in its holding, but in
its ostensible rule of law. To equate an inquiry into the motiva-
tion behind an act with an inquiry into the validity of a sover-
eign act affords future wrongdoers a broad shield by which to
avoid antitrust liability. The sovereign political interest to
which Mobil Oil was sensitive can be protected through less
sweeping measures.
This comment proposes a two-part test which incorporates
the Mobil Oil rationales into a limited rule specifically de-
signed for the antitrust context. For a plaintiff to recover
against a defendant for alleged antitrust violations: (1) the
sovereign act which results in injury must be significantly at-
tributable to the independent behavior of the private defen-
dant, and (2) the private efforts to motivate the sovereign, if
they employ a state's policymaking processes, must
"wrongfully" employ those processes.
The first test derives from Parker v. Brown. 00 In upholding
a state program designed to restrict competition in, and main-
tain the prices of, California raisins, the Court held that the
Sherman Act did not apply to restraints of trade by officers and
agents of the State of California."' The raisin program "derived
its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of
the state and was not intended to operate or become effective
without that command.' ' 2
However, sovereign participation in itself does not bar the
application of the Sherman Act. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 10 the Court declared illegal Detroit Edison's practice of
giving free light bulbs to its customers. 04 The fact that this
practice was approved in a tariff issued by the Michigan Public
Service Commission did not bar Sherman liability. The Court
found that Detroit Edison "exercised sufficient freedom of
100. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
101. Id. at 346.
102. Id. at 350.
103. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
104. The effect of this practice was to eliminate sellers of light bulbs. Id. at 584,
581 n.3.
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choice" in embarking on the program "that [it] should be held
responsible for the consequences of [its] decision."'' °
Respondent could not maintain the lamp exchange program
without the approval of the Commission, and now may not aban-
don it without such approval. Nevertheless, there can be no
doubt that the option to have, or not to have, such a program is
primarily respondent's not the Commission's.1'
The Cantor Court, in imposing liability on Detroit Edison,
avoided specific causal analysis. Rather, defendant's "parti-
cipation in the [Commission's] decision [was] sufficiently
significant" to invoke the antitrust laws.'0 7 The exact levels of
required significance remain unarticulated.' 8
Despite the lack of an explicit rule, Cantor offers a stan-
dard which the Mobil Oil court could have used to advan-
tage.'0 1 Although Cantor does not mention the but for test em-
ployed in Mobil Oil, that test could be implied from Cantor.
The necessary "mixture of private and public decisionmak-
ing" '0 implies that the sovereign act must be one which the
sovereign would not have performed but for the additional im-
105. Id. at 593. See Litton Systems, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 539
F.2d 418, 424 (5th Cir. 1976).
106. 428 U.S. at 594.
107. Id.
108. For an excellent article which argues for a broad application of Parker im-
munity written before the Cantor decision see Handler, The Current Attack on the
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COL. L. Rsv. 1 (1976).
109. The dissent in Mobil Oil cites Cantor to support the argument that sovereign
participation alone does not confer antitrust immunity on a wrongdoer (at 80). State
action immunity is close to, if not but a particular application of, the act of state
doctrine. For example note the compulsion language in Goldfarb:
The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is
state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is
whether the activity is required by the State acting as sovereign .... It
is not enough that as the County Bar puts it, anticompetitive conduct is
"prompted" by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be
compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1975). The principal distinction
between Parker immunity and the act of state doctrine is that the former requires
inquiry into the motivation of sovereign acts, the latter apparently does not. However,
should the Supreme Court ever specifically adopt the act of state analysis posited in
this Comment, the two doctrines would become so nearly identical that the act of state
doctrine could be ignored in the antitrust context. See W. FUGATE, supra note 1, § 2.21,
at 79 n.14. See generally Cofinco Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,456
at 67,056-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (illustrating that the act of state defense often requires
resolving significant issues of fact).
110. Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. at 594.
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petus of private influence. The added possibility of conflict of
laws problems might further justify a narrow application of
Cantor in the international setting."'
However qualified by the international context, the
Parker-Cantor analysis directly addresses the problems inher-
ent in the semipublic antitrust violation. It affords an analyti-
cal tool for divorcing private behavior from public behavior in
order to determine if private acts violate the antitrust laws."'
The immunity employed through Parker is only as broad as the
involvement of the sovereign's authority itself. As a result
Parker-Cantor avoids the overly-broad prophylactic immunity
which results from the application of the act of state doctrine
to semipublic sovereign acts.
VIII. NOERR ANALYSIS APPLIED TO FOREIGN POLITICAL
PROCESSES
Where the relevant private involvement is in the form of
attempts to utilize the policymaking process to influence the
foreign sovereign, plaintiff must further show that that influ-
ence was a "wrongful" use of that foreign political process.",
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc. provides the initial standards of wrongful use of
the political process."' Noerr ruled that a conspiracy in pursuit
of one's right to petition is not subject to the Sherman Act,",
provided that these efforts to influence government were not "a
mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of
a competitor .. ". ."I" United Mine Workers of America v.
111. In one sense Cantor itself involves conflict of law questions. Although federal
policy normally dominates state policy, the determination of public utility rates and
tariffs represents a peculiarly state function. In fact Congress has restricted federal
judicial review of state rate determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970).
112. Baker, Antitrust & World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8
ComN. INT'L L.J. 16, 38-39 (1974).
113. The Court in Cantor denies the application of Noerr-type immunity to De-
troit Edison apparently on the grounds that Detroit Edison's behavior was not directed
toward the political process. 428 U.S. at 601-02.
114. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
115. Id. at 136.
116. Id. at 144 (emphasis added). Noerr involved a suit by a group of trucking
companies against a railroad trade association for alleged unfair efforts to deter pas-
sage of laws favorable to the trucking industry and to encourage unfavorable laws.
Three factual considerations may well have influenced the Court's decision. This was
a fight between two large industries; one could not drive the other out of business.
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Pennington elaborated on Noerr, dramatizing the rule that
even a showing of wrongful intent does not invoke the Sherman
Act where the focus of that intent is the influence of public
works projects,' efforts to intimidate public officials."'
However, later cases distinguishing Noerr clearly demon-
strate that there exists a distinction between use and misuse
of the right to petition. California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited"' denied Noerr protection where defen-
dants' activities were such as to effectively deny plaintiff's ac-
cess to the regulatory body from which it procured its required
licenses." 9 The effect of defendants' acts were "to usurp that
decisionmaking process."''2 Other examples of wrongful use of
one's right to influence government include bribery,' 2' efforts to
foreclose bidding on public works projects,'22 efforts to intimi-
date public officials through threats, 2 3 and misrepresentation
of key facts to an adjudicatory agency.'24
Although one would be hard pressed to derive an absolute
rule from the cases interpreting Noerr, a certain theme pre-
dominates: Was the influence an attempt to interfere directly
with the business relationships of a competitor, 2 5 or, put an-
other way, was the influence directed at the policymaking pro-
cess or designed to subvert and thwart that process? 2
Second, the truckers also participated in their own publicity campaigns. And third,
the focus of the influence was on legislative, not adjudicative, bodies, the former
apparently better equipped to handle misleading information.
117. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
But see also Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. 1972 Trade Cas. 74,234
(D. Haw. 1972) (predatory intent with the purpose of eliminating competition invokes
the sham exception to Noerr).
118. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
119. Id. at 511. See Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
120. 404 U.S. at 512.
121. Ranger, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966). But see Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Produ-
cers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696 (D. Colo. 1975).
122. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
123. Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Local 150, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 440
F.2d 1096 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
124. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
125. Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cow
Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696, 704 (D. Colo. 1975).
126. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 33
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v.
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Although somewhat undefined in their domestic applica-
tion, these Noerr standards, by their very vagueness serve the
foreign context well. Vague standards of misuse will permit the
courts to adjust to the varying political processes of foreign
nations. Moreover, by focusing on the policy process as the
source of immunity, conflict of laws problems are minimized.
The court has automatically accomodated, at least to some
extent, the policy considerations of foreign governments by
granting immunity for use of that government's policy pro-
cesses.'
It has been argued that the Noerr doctrine, being derived
from the first amendment, is inappropriate for the foreign set-
ting.' 21 Such analysis distorts the rationale of Noerr. Noerr
immunity derives more from the fundamental functioning of
every state than from the magic of the first amendment. A
state needs informative inputs in order to act with a modicum
of efficiency. Similarly, citizens require some right to petition
in order that government might make some effort to meet their
social demands.' 9 If anything is common to all nations, it is the
right, albeit subject to varying limits, to petition one's own
government. 130
Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1298 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1047 (1972).
In intepreting sham as used by Noerr, the 10th Circuit states:
[T]he term "sham" in this context would appear to mean misuse or
corruption of the legal process. Therefore, the utilization of the court or
administrative agency in a manner which is in accordance with the spirit
of the law continues to be exempt from the antitrust laws.
Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir. 1972). See Franchise
Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Work-
ers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976).
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 (1971) for a list of
the general factors examined in conflict of laws cases.
128. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972),
for example, found Noerr analysis inappropriate for the foreign context, based upon
the doctrine's roots in the first amendment. Id. at 108.
129. H. LASSwELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SocIgrY: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL
INQUIRY (1950).
130. For example, the Supreme Court in Continental Ore did not question the
potential applicability of Noerr in the foreign context. In fact, the Court spent time
distinguishing the case based on the fact that defendants did not petition the political
process but rather "engaged in private commercial activity." 370 U.S. at 707.
The Justice Department has expressed a similar view:
While the Noerr case turns in part on U.S. domestic constitutional con-
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Contrary to the district court's view in Mobil Oil, applica-
tion of the rule granting immunity for use of the policy process
might well bar Hunt's claim.131 As stated, the act of nationali-
zation was a peculiarly political act, an executive decree. Un-
like Cantor, which involved "private action taken in complic-
ance with state law" and was thus not subject to Noerr, 3 argu-
ably the Seven Sisters appealed to the executive in his role as
policymaker.133 Therefore, whatever influence the Seven Sisters
exerted, whatever their anticompetitive intent, as long as they
remained properly within the Libyan political processes their
acts were immune from antitrust liability.'3
The recent Timberlane decision offers dramatic evidence
of the potential utility of Cantor and Noerr analysis in the
foreign setting. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America'35
found actionable defendants' alleged use of spurious claims in
the Honduran courts to thwart plaintiff's entry into the local
timber industry exporting to the United States. 30 The court
declined to judge the Timberlane claim according to a rigid act
of state rule, declaring: "Whether forbearance by an American
court in a given situation is advisable or appropriate depends
upon the 'balance of relevant considerations." '1 37 Those rele-
siderations, the Department does not consider it to be limited to the
domestic area. The Supreme Court's discussion in Continental Ore Co.
v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., implies as much.
ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, supra note 83, at E-18 (footnotes
omitted). See also Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered,
8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 9-11 (1974).
131. The district court stated that Noerr did not apply to Mobil Oil since that
immunity applied only to action "to procure passage or enforcement" of a law. 410 F.
Supp. at 20. As amply illustrated above, such an interpretation overly restricts Noerr.
See, e.g., note 126 supra.
132. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 601-02 (1976).
133. According to paragraph 64 of Hunt's complaint, the Seven Sisters
"manipulated the course of Libyan negotiations." Mobil Oil at 72 n.2. Presumably oil
negotiations, given their critical importance to the entire nation of Libya, is an execu-
tive policy making function within the scope of Noerr.
134. What constitutes misuse of the foreign political process may be tempered by
our own biases, however. In many countries bribes, or "baqsheesh," are customary
means of influencing the political process. The FTC has initiated investigations into
whether foreign bribes by the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. might constitute "unfair trade
practices." BNA 1976 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 779, at A-11. It will be
interesting to see if the Federal Trade Commission tempers their prosecution based
on foreign political customs.
135. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
136. Id. at 605.
137. Id. at 606.
1977
774 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
vant considerations are primarily whether the sovereign agent
"has exercised its jurisdiction to give effect to its public
interests. "13 The court determined:
A judgment of a court may be an act of state. Usually it is not,
because it involves the interests of private litigants or because
court adjudication is not the usual way in which the state exer-
cises its jurisdiction to give effect to public interests.'3'
Since the Honduran judicial action did not reflect the exercise
of public policy for the public interest, the court ruled that the
act of state doctrine did not apply.
Although couched in act of state terms, Timberlane's pub-
lic interest test more appropriately addresses the significant
private action test of Cantor and the abuse of process-sham
exception-of the Noerr doctrine. For example, Cantor would
weigh the involvement of the state's public interest by assess-
ing the relative degree of independent private and public deci-
sionmaking involved in the act. Noerr would weigh public in-
terest by immunizing acts properly petitioning the sovereign's
public policy processes. Most important, Cantor and Noerr
would offer the additional advantage of focusing only on pri-
vate, not public, behavior. As a result the Cantor-Noerr ap-
proach avoids the dangers of unwarranted blanket immunity
that results from the inappropriate application of act of state
rules to private behavior. Thus, at a minimum, Timberlane
presented a classic Cal-Motor abuse of process fact pattern'"
and should have been judged on those grounds.
IX. CONCLUSION
With potentially justiciable international interaction con-
stantly on the rise, courts can no longer employ the act of state
doctrine as a safe harbor for weathering difficult foreign anti-
trust cases."' The act of state doctrine must be limited to those
circumstances for which it was designed, i.e., acts of sovereign
compulsion and direction. Private acts must be judged accord-
138. Id. at 607 (emphasis in original).
139. Id. at 607-08.
140. See text accompanying notes 118-124 supra.
141. As the Justice Department has commented the sovereign act defenses "often
are claimed much more broadly than seems appropriate if the Department is to carry
out its essential function of protecting the competitiveness of U.S. markets and export
opportunities." ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, supra note 83, at E-
3.
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ing to appropriate antitrust rules, adapted for the international
setting. To stretch the act of state doctrine to apply to private
as well as sovereign behavior will lead only to inevitable confu-
sion.

